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1. Introduction  
The interest in the topic has occurred to me when the COVID-19 pandemic started having 
clear effects on the economy in the Summer of 2020 and a higher risk of default has 
become a reality for many companies. While there are established practices of determining 
and predicting the default by credit-issuing institutions, more accurate, up-to-date, and 
dynamic methods are needed for the current situation when many firms are at risk. On the 
other hand, ESG-reporting has become more common in the last decade and the effects of 
the environmental, social, and governance activities on firm performance have been 
studied more intensively. While there has been extensive research conducted on the CSR 
(corporate social responsibility) and its implications on stakeholders, E (environmental) 
and S (social) aspects have not been studied as much. With this paper, I aim to contribute 
to this research.  
 
I came across a study performed by Baghdadi, Nguyen, and Podolski (2019), which 
attempted to find a connection between co-opted boards and default risk with a sample of 
U.S. public firms (excluding financial firms) in 1996 and 2014. Baghdadi et al. have found 
that co-opted boards (following the definition by Coles et al. (2014), co-opted boards are 
directors appointed by the CEO after assuming office) are contributing to the default risk 
by their erratic and arbitrary decisions. This in turn leads to higher stock return volatility 
and fundamental volatility in firms with co-opted boards. According to their study, the co-
opted boards are not necessarily characterized by more risk-taking, but they are less 
involved in strategic decision-making. Some external oversight mechanisms, such as 
analysts or institutional investors, mitigate some of the effects documented by Baghdadi et 
al. (2019). This interesting relationship between the co-opted boards and the default risk 
would be interesting to study on the European firms if the data were regularly collected for 
these firms. On the other hand, ESG-scores data is available for more firms every year and 
it is an interesting variable to look at in relation to default risk. According to my 
knowledge, there has not previously been a similar study performed for European firms for 
the time when more ESG-data has been available for most of the firms and therefore I 
would like to contribute to closing this gap with my research paper. 
  
The research question is as follows: 
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What is the effect of the ESG policies on the default risk: do higher ESG-scores make the 
firms’ probability of default higher or do they reduce the risk based on the dataset from 
European corporate markets in 2000-2019? 
 
Some of the existing literature suggests that ESG-activities can be beneficial for the firm’s 
ability to meet its debt obligations, as such activities are positively linked to the firm’s 
financial performance. On the other hand, several authors point out that ESG can become a 
way for the management to build reputation, while not paying enough attention to the 
value-optimization of the firm. These different positions create a possibility for opposite 
effects ESG-activities may have on a probability of default – increase or decrease it. As a 
result, the opposite answers to my research question are equally possible.  
  
Hypothesis 1 - the higher ESG-activities increase the default probability of a firm. 
 
This hypothesis is in line with the agency theory, which has been suggested as an 
explanation of higher CSR activity by Rizwan, Obaid, & Ashraf (2017) and higher ESG-
activity by Dorfleitner, Kreuzer & Sparrer (2020). Both studies suggest that it is possible 
for CSR or ESG-activity to negatively affect the firm’s performance, and therefore 
increase the default risk, since managers seek personal benefits, such as public recognition, 
by engaging in the ESG-activity, while the shareholder value decreases, and the financial 
performance is poor. The investments in the ESG-activities may not be optimal for the 
firm’s financial performance, therefore agency problem occurs.  
 
Dorfleitner et al (2020) presented several views on why higher ESG-activity could be 
positively influencing financial performance. They point out that it is possible when the 
costs associated with the ESG-activities are overestimated or when the benefits from such 
activities exceed expectations. This is supported by Dorfleitner et al.’s (2018) findings that 
higher socially responsible activities can be linked to unexpected additional cash-flows in 
the mid- or long-term. And while Rizwan et al.z (2017) use different methods of defining 
the levels of the ESG-activity, they also find evidence that higher ESG-scores are linked to 
a lower probability of default. This view could help clarify the results if they do not 
support my first hypothesis. 
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In parallel, I am checking the effects of the ESG Controversies score on the default 
probability. The data on the ESG Controversies scores is easily retrievable together with 
the ESG scores since these two measures are often registered at the same time. The higher 
the score for both the ESG score and for the ESG Controversies score, the better the 
company has performed through their ESG activities and in terms of working with 
controversies. For ESG Controversies score calculation, Refinitiv identifies 23 controversy 
topics and collects data from the global media (Refinitiv, 2021). 
 
Dorfleitner et al. (2020) suggested that providing the ESG Controversies information 
reduces the inefficiency of the market. They point out that ESG-scandals cause public 
attention and are immediately priced, while the absence of the scandals leave such firms’ 
activity unnoticed and even overlooked. It is also noted by them that the ESG 
Controversies scores are comparable to the credit default scores since they both evaluate 
the absence of an infrequent event. With these findings in mind, I find it reasonable to 
propose the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 – the ESG Controversies scores are negatively related to the 
probability of default.  
 
As previously explained regarding ESG scores and their relation to the probability of 
default, the opposite outcomes of the investigation of the relation between ESG 
Controversies scores and the probability of default are also possible. 
 
It is worth mentioning that endogeneity concerns can be present in terms of understanding 
casual relationships between ESG activities and the probability of default. Baghdadi et al. 
(2019) raise this issue in their study and address it with the data available regarding co-
opted boards. Soytas et al. (2019) discuss in their paper endogeneity concerns in the 
relationship between sustainability and financial performance. They highlight that there is 
a pitfall in the ways to address the endogeneity in the previous research. Soytas et al. 
suggest possible sources of endogeneity being a firm’s unobserved productivity level and 
the marginal cost of sustainability. Their results show that sustainability activities are more 
expensive for more productive firms (i.e. with highly efficient processes), which in turn 
may lead to a downward bias in OLS-estimations. Another potential source of endogeneity 
pointed out by Soytas et al. is the comparative advantage bias. They argue that firms with a 
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higher ratio of financial returns to sustainability investments are more incentivized to 
undertake the sustainability initiatives. The authors conclude with their results that 
productivity bias dominates comparative advantage bias. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I next present an overview of the current 
literature, followed by the data and methodology presented in the section after that. I 
present the results in the “Results” section, after which the “Conclusion” concludes the 
thesis and presents limitations of this research as well as possibilities for further research. 
2. Literature review  The current interest in ESG-investing generated an overwhelming amount of research. 
Friede et al. (2015) have made a comprehensive review of the research related to ESG and 
corporate financial performance (CFP) – a combination of findings from 2200 individual 
studies. Friede et al. view corporate financial performance measures as accounting-based 
performance, market-based performance, operational performance, perceptual 
performance, growth metrics, risk measures, and the performance of ESG-portfolios. This 
review supports the notion of the popularity of the research about ESG as well as it touches 
upon some measures impacting the default risk, which makes it interesting for me to 
investigate the patterns as well as the gaps in the research. 
 
Friede et al. use two-step method – vote-count studies (analyzing the category of the 
results and “voting” the winners) and meta-analyses (econometric review studies). 
However, acknowledging that the knowledge regarding the topic is fragmented, Friede et 
al. (2015) take notice that most studies they review in their work state a positive finding 
(90% of the studies find non-negative relation between ESG and CFP). The positive effect 
of the ESG is believed to be stable over time as well. Most of the studies analyze the ESG 
effects on CFP in equities (87,1% in vote-count sample). ESG pillars-wise, the positive 
effect of E, S, and G on corporate financial performance is divided relatively even between 
the pillars. 62,3% of the vote-count studies point at positive effect related to the G 
(governance), 58,7% - in relation to E (environmental) and 55,1% in relation to S (social). 
Most of the negative findings are related to G (9,2%), compared to other pillars (4,3% to E 
and 5,1% to S). The study also analyses the findings across different parts of the world. 
The two main patterns Friede et al. point out: first, developed markets, excluding North 
America, exhibit a smaller share of positive results (e.g. in developed Europe only 27,8% 
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of studies find positive relations between ESG and CFP), and second, emerging markets 
show a considerably higher proportion of positive outcomes (65,4%). The authors note that 
most studies are performed on portfolios, which potentially includes a bias. After 
excluding portfolio studies, the share of the positive findings increases in both developed 
and emerging countries. These results make it clear that trends in ESG-effects cannot be 
applied universally across geographics, neither it cannot be assumed that they always relate 
positively to financial performance. My study is non-portfolio and is focusing on the 
European market, which is less studied than North American.  
 
Different results have been shown by Bannier, Bofinger, and Rock (2019), who test a 
portfolio of U.S. and European stocks with long in stocks with highest ESG scores and 
short in stocks with the lowest ESG scores. Their study showed that stocks with the highest 
ESG scores showed negative abnormal returns, while the stocks with the low ESG scores 
were trading at a premium. ESG activities are seen as a way of insurance, which in turn 
means that the firms with low ESG activities are carrying more risk. The authors also 
conclude that different market phases affect whether ESG is perceived as insurance to less 
or more extent. Viewing ESG activities as a way of insurance would not support my first 
hypothesis, but could support the opposite - ESG activities could be negatively related to 
the probability of default.   
 
CSR (corporate social responsibility) is an aspect of ESG, which has been monitored 
closely as more firms have been reporting on it. It is focusing on the firm’s relationships 
with the stakeholders and therefore the researchers are interested in whether it may affect 
the performance of the firm or its risk among other things. The CSR activities' effect on the 
financial performance of the firms has been studied by Goss and Roberts (2011) or Wu and 
Shen (2013). The way CSR affects the firm’s risk has been investigated in several studies 
(Benlemlih and Girerd-Potin (2014); Jo & Na (2012); Oikonomou, Brammer, Brooks and, 
Pavelin (2012). Similar to how ESG-activities, in general, might be perceived as a way of 
insurance for a firm’s cash flows, CSR is mentioned to be viewed as insurance-like 
protection (Godfrey, 2015). Badayi, Matemilola, N and Wei, 2020 point out in their paper 
that the influence of CSR on the probability of default has not been studied enough, and 
their research attempts to contribute to that topic. They studied the effect of CSR on the 
probability of default in developing countries between 2010-2017. The results of their 
paper suggest that with the increase of CSR activities among the firms in developing 
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countries, the probability of default decreases. One of the objectives of my research is to 
see whether the same effect can be found in European countries, however, I investigated 
the ESG activities as a whole, not only CSR. As can be seen further in my literature 
review, these terms sometimes are replaced by each other, or ESG-score is taken as a 
proxy for CSR. 
 
In addition to studying the effect of CSR on financial risk (Benlemlih and Girerd-Potin, 
2014), Benlemlih studies how environmental and social disclosures affect a firm’s risk 
(Benlemlih, Shaukat, Qiu, et al., 2018). They find that disclosure of such information 
reduces idiosyncratic and total risk, but not systematic risk. One explanation offered by 
Benlemlih et al. (2018) is that firms disclosing their environmental and social information 
are more transparent and therefore can build a more positive reputation and trust among 
stakeholders. Besides the main objective of Benlemlih et al.'s (2018) research, they touch 
upon an issue of whether extensive disclosures (in their case on E and S) are linked to 
superior performance in these areas. For my research, I consider ESG scores and ESG 
Controversies scores and the major difference between these two measures, that only ESG 
score is based on the disclosures by the company. ESG Controversies score is based on the 
events revealed by the media related to controversial ESG activities. Therefore, it will not 
be surprising if the relations of these two measures with the probability of default are 
different. 
 
The uncertainty lies within knowing whether higher ESG-scores reflect the better ESG-
performance. Benlemlih et al. (2018) point out that there are certain circumstances when 
investors, firms, or managers of the firms benefit from providing objective disclosures (i.e., 
reflecting truthful information regarding E and S activities). These circumstances are 1) 
reduced asymmetric information helping investors make their investment decisions, 2) 
regulations in these areas making firms issue objective disclosures, 3) benefits of objective 
disclosures exceeding their costs, 4) objective disclosures bringing corporate benefits such 
as reducing implied cost of capital and higher market values. Providing extensive 
disclosures contributes to these benefits as well. 
 
Few authors studied the relation of the CSR/ESG-activity and the probability of default, 
which is directly related to my research and therefore I am interested to compare the 
methods and the results of the research. In 2020, Badayi et al. published a study of the 
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firms from 17 developing countries. They found that high CSR (ESG score from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream is used as a proxy in their study) participation is related negatively to 
the probability of default in developing countries, however, this hypothesis did not hold in 
the African and Middle Eastern region. The main explanation of the results lies within the 
fact that improved CSR performance positively affects customer satisfaction and thus cash 
flows increase, which in turn makes the probability of defaulting on the debt obligations 
smaller. They also refer to the stakeholder theory and studies where it is shown that being 
active in CSR improves relationships with stakeholders by maximizing their wealth 
(Jiraporn et al, 2014), which in turn helps improve stock valuations (Jiao, 2010) and lower 
the cost of financing (El Ghoul et al., 2011). The stakeholder theory and the connection 
between the higher ESG activities and improved cash-flows could be a possible 
explanation to the opposite of my hypothesis – a higher ESG score is negatively related to 
the probability of default.  
 
Another study, conducted by Rizwan et al. (2017), contributes to the research of the 
relation between CSR activities and probability of default, which is used as a proxy for the 
credit risk. They studied U.S. firms and found that their evidence does not support the 
agency theory but is in favor of the wealth protection function of CSR. Rizwan et al. 
(2017) split the scores into the technical (primary stakeholders related) and institutional 
(secondary stakeholders related) and find that technical CSR negatively affects the credit 
risk, while institutional CSR has insignificant relationships with the credit risk. This study 
also used a different measure of the CSR activities – data from the KLD research and 
analytics database, which has 13 dimensions of CSR, and the companies receive strength 
or weaknesses scores in each of the dimensions. This paper offers explanations for both 
outcomes – negative and positive relation of the ESG activities to the probability of 
default. On the one hand, the negative effect of the ESG activities on the default risk can 
be explained by the wealth protection function of the ESG (similar to the insurance view) – 
which would support the opposite explanation for my first hypothesis. On the other hand, 
the agency theory can explain if the ESG activities increase the probability of default, 
meaning that the managers use the ESG activities as the way to improve their reputation, 
but do not care about the stakeholders’ wealth – this could be a possible explanation to 
support my first hypothesis. Rizwan et al. (2017) address endogeneity by using the GMM-
estimator (Generalized-Method-of-Moments), developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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3. Data and methodology  The sample consists of the firm data on 423 public European firms during 2000 and 2019 
from Thomson Reuters/Refinitiv database. Following Baghdadi et al. (2019) and other 
authors, the financial firms were excluded from the sample. The data needed for 
calculating the EDF was available for the entire sample without missing values. However, 
I needed data for ESG scores, ESG controversies, and some fundamental data for control 
variables, where not all these values were available for all the firms or all years. Therefore, 
I performed the regressions on an unbalanced sample. 
 
The following part of the paper discusses the methods used in my research: 
 
1) Defining default risk by using the Merton DD (distance-to-default) model;  
2) Regression on the association between ESG and default risk. 
 
3.1 Merton’s distance-to-default model  Badghdadi et al. (2019) use the Merton distance-to-default (Merton DD) model, which had 
been earlier described and tested in the study done by Bharath and Shumway (2008). The 
model is also earlier discussed in Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Saunders and Allen 
(2002). It is applied by Vassalou and Xing (2004); Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007); and 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007), among others. The model was first suggested by 
Merton (1974) and developed by the proprietors of the KMV corporation. 
 
Under the model, the firm’s equity is a call option on the underlying value of the firm with 
the strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt. Underlying value and its 
volatility are not observable but can be inferred from the value of equity, its volatility, and 
some other observable variables. (Bharath and Shumway, 2008) 
 
After inferring these values, the model specifies that the probability of default is the 
normal cumulative density function of a z-score depending on 1) the firm's underlying 
value, 2) the firm's volatility, and 3) the face value of the firm's debt. 
 
The Merton DD model subtracts the face value of the firm's debt from an estimate of the 
market value of the firm and then divides this difference by an estimate of the volatility of 
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the firm (scaled to reflect the horizon of the forecast). Result – z-score, or distance to 
default (DD). 
 
Z-score is then substituted into a cumulative density function to calculate the probability 
that the value of the firm will be less than the face value of debt at the forecasting horizon. 
The first step in implementing the Merton DD model is to estimate σE (stock volatility) 
from either historical stock returns data or from option-implied volatility data. The second 
step is to choose a forecasting horizon and a measure of the face value of the firm's debt. 
For example, it is common to use historical returns data to estimate σE, assume a 
forecasting horizon of 1 year (T = 1), and take the book value of the firm's total liabilities 
to be the face value of the firm's debt or calculate the face value of debt by adding short-
term debt and half of the long-term debt. The third step is to collect values of the risk-free 
rate and the market equity of the firm. After performing these three steps, all values are 




and                                
σE=(V/E)N(d1)σV 
 
except for V and σV, the total value of the firm and the volatility of firm value, respectively. 
After solving the above-mentioned equations numerically for V and σV, one can proceed to 
the distance to default DD: 
 
 
where μ is an estimate of the expected annual return of the firm's assets. And: 
 
 





Baghdadi et al. (2019) use the modified version of the Merton (1974) structural distance-
to-default model to measure default risk in their research, which I am using in my research 













 x 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
 x (0,05 + 0,25 x 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡) 
 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 
 
where Equityi,t is the market value of equity and Debti,t is the face value of debt, calculated 
as the sum of the short-term debt and half of the long-term debt. ri,t-1 is firm i’s past annual 
return, calculated from monthly stock returns over the previous year. σEi,t, is the annualized 
stock volatility for firm i during year t estimated from the monthly stock return over the 
previous year. σVi,t, is an approximation of the volatility of firm i’s assets. N(.) is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
 
3.2 Regression and ESG measures  
Further, Baghdadi et al. (2019) use the portion of co-opted board members as the main 
measure of the co-option. I use the ESG-score as the main independent variable.  
 
Baghdadi et al. (2019) estimate the following regression with standard errors corrected for 
heterogeneity and firm-level clustering:  
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹it = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜-𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛it-1 + 𝛽2𝑍 it-1 + i + 𝛿t 
 
where i and t refer to firm i and year t, EDF is default risk, Co-option as an independent 
variable, Z is a set of controls, which includes board size (Ln Board Size), board 
independent (Independent), the market value of equity (Ln Equity), the book value of debt 
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(Ln Debt), the reciprocal of the annualized standard deviation of stock return (1/σE), annual 
excess stock return (Excess Return), profitability (ROA), the proportion share ownership 
held by institutional blockholders (Blockholder), Amihud measure of illiquidity (Amihud), 
dividends to total assets ratio (Dividends/Assets), and the proportion of female directors 
serving on the board of directors (Female).  
 
I will perform the regression on the ESG scores and separately on ESG Controversies 
instead of the Co-option, using the following fixed-effect regression with standard errors 
corrected for heterogeneity and using firm and/or year as fixed effects: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 
 
where control variables are the market value of equity (lnEquity), the book value of Debt 
(lnDebt), the inverse volatility of stock return (1/σE), annual excess return (Excess return), 
return on assets as a profitability measure (ROA) and illiquidity measure (Amihud). 
 
ESG score provided by Refinitiv is based on 500 company-level ESG measures, that are 
assessed on materiality (weights 1 to 10 given for each measure depending on the 
importance of the measure for a particular industry) and eventually grouped into 10 
categories of three pillars – environmental, social and governance. Refinitiv uses percentile 
rank scoring methodology to calculate these 10 category scores: 
 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒
2
𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
 
As Refinitiv (2021) states in their brochure, the score is designed to provide transparent 
and objective data, based on the company reported data and relative to peers. The scores 
are measured between 0 and 100, with 100 being the best score. The scores are updated 
regularly, usually once a year, but it can happen more often in case of a major event in a 
company. The scores are also not necessarily fixed once they are registered in the Refinitiv 
database, they are only “definitive” for the years prior to the past five years. This means 
that corrections can be added for the past five years’ data points in case of the company’s 
restatements or changes in the underlying data (Refinitiv, 2021). This can be potentially 
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dangerous in terms of further analysis, where ESG-data is used, as pointed out by Berg et 
al. (2021).  
 
For ESG Controversies score calculation, Refinitiv identifies 23 controversy topics and 
collects data from the global media (Refinitiv, 2021). Therefore, this data is not provided 
by the company but is independently collected based on the company’s publicity regarding 
a scandal or any other controversial event. Some events may continue affecting the 
company’s reputation in the following years. Also, Refinitiv states, that the controversies 
score addresses the market cap bias by using severity rates, as larger companies usually 
attract more attention. The ESG Controversies score is measured between 0 and 100, with 
100 indicating that a company had no controversies.  
 
3.3 Control variables  Baghdadi et al. (2019) control the five direct determinants of default risk: the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity (Ln Equity), the natural logarithm of the face value 
of debt (Ln Debt), the inverse of annualized stock volatility (1/σE), the difference between 
the stock’s annual return and the value-weighted return (Excess Return), and the ratio of 
net income to the total assets (ROA). They also control for stock liquidity referring to 
Brogaard et al.'s (2017) paper, which points to a strong relationship between the stock 
liquidity, and the firm’s bankruptcy risk. Baghdadi et al. use for this purpose illiquidity 
measure (Amihud) suggested by Amihud (2002). Amihud measure is defined as the annual 
average of the daily ratio of the absolute value of stock return and Euro trading volume, 
multiplied by one million.  
 
I use the same control variables as well, calculated the same way, and retrieving the initial 
value for calculations from the Refinitiv Screener and Refinitiv Datastream. Unlike 
Baghdadi et al., I do not control for corporate governance, the board size, the independent 
directors on the board, dividends to total assets ratio, and the proportion of female directors 
serving on the board of directors. All variables had been winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to alleviate the effects of outliers. The one exception is default frequency as its 
values are naturally bounded between 0 and 1.  
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Table 1 below presents summary statistics for the chosen variables, while Table 2 contains 
the correlation results for the same variables. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The sample consists of 8460 firm-year observations during the 2000-2019 period, representing 423 non-financial European public companies. A detailed variable definition is provided in Appendix. 
Variable Mean Std.dev. P25 Median P75 
1. Dependent variable     
EDF 0,02 0,118 0,000 0,000 0,000 
2. Independent variables     
ESG_score 53,30 20,854 37,03 54,69 69,10 
ESG_contr 86,93 26,343 91,67 100 100 
3. Other variables     
lnEquity 21,88 1,583 20,79 21,82 22,93 
Excess return 0,16 1,954 -0,07 0,13 0,32 
lnDebt 18,88 4,312 18,28 19,76 21,04 
1/σE 4,45 2,243 2,97 4,11 5,53 ROA 0,06 0,068 0,03 0,05 0,08 
Annual return 0,16 1,960 -0,07 0,14 0,33 
Amihud 0,02 0,240 0,00006 0,0003 0,002  
As can be seen from the summary table, the EDF measure lies between 0 and 1, where 
measures located closer to 0 indicate a lower probability of default. The mean EDF is 0,02 
for the entire sample. From the correlation table, we see that EDF is negatively correlated 
with most of the variables and on a statistically significant level of 1 or 5% (except for the 
ESG Controversies score). The slightly positively correlated measures are lnDebt and 
Amihud (significant at 1% level).  
 
The correlation between ESG score and EDF is negative (however, not statistically 
significant), which might suggest that their relationship is negative. But to make any more 
conclusive statements, further analysis should be conducted. The influence of control 
variables and unobserved variables needs to be addressed to establish the relationship 






Table 2. Correlation results 
This table presents correlation results for the variables I used in the study. The sample consists of 8460 firm-year observations during the 2000-2019 period, representing 423 non-financial European public companies. A detailed variable definition is provided in Appendix. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels. 
Variable EDF ESG_score ESG_contr lnEquity Excess return  lnDebt  1/σE  ROA Annual return 
          
EDF 1,00         
ESG_score -0,04** 1,00        
ESG_contr -0,02 -0,3*** 1,00       
lnEquity -0,24*** 0,55*** -0,34*** 1,00      Excess return -0,07*** -0,04*** 0,02* 0,03* 1,00     
lnDebt 0,05*** 0,32*** -0,2*** 0,38*** -0,02 1,00    
1/σE -0,22*** 0,17*** -0,02 0,36*** 0,002 0,1*** 1,00   
ROA -0,13*** -0,06*** 0,04*** 0,14*** 0,03**  -0,25***  0,12***  1,00  Annual return -0,08*** -0,04*** 0,03* 0,03* 0,1***  -0,02  0,01  0,03*  1,00 
Amihud 0,02*** -0,05*** 0,02 -0,08*** 0,004  -0,007  -0,05***  -0,02  0,004  
 
ESG score and ESG Controversies score have a maximum value of 100, which indicates 
the best ESG performance. The mean for ESG score is 53,3 and for ESG Controversies 
score is 86,9. The correlation between these two measures is negative and significant at a 
1% level. The correlation between ESG score and all other variables is significant at 1% 
level, it is mostly negative, except for lnEquity, lnDebt, and Inverse volatility.  On the other 
hand, ESG Controversies is only significantly correlated with five variables: slightly 
positively at 10% significance level with Annual return and Excess return, at 1% 
significance level positively correlated with ROA, and at 1% significance level negatively 
correlated with lnEquity and lnDebt. 
4. Results  In this section, I present the results of the regressions and discuss them. Following the 
Baghdadi et al. (2019), I also perform an OLS regression of the default risk EDF, however 
not on Co-option as the reference paper has done, but on the ESG scores: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡 
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Here, EDFit is the default risk, ESG_scoreit is the ESG score collected from the Thompson 
Reuters database, Zit is the set of control variables and 𝑡 is the error term. The control 
variables are lnEquity the natural logarithm of Equity, lnDebt the natural logarithm of the 
face value of Debt (calculates as the short-term debt plus 0,5 of the long-term debt), 1/σE 
the inverse stock volatility, ROA the return on assets (calculated as the net income divided 
by the total assets) and Excess_return the excess return (calculated as the difference 
between the total return of the firm and the market return taken as the CRSP value-
weighted return. 
 
I first ran the OLS regression without including any control variables, then I ran further 
regressions while adding control variables one by one. And finally, I have performed 
fixed-effect regressions with all control variables included and using the combination of 
both the firm and/or the year as a fixed effect: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐺_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 
 
4.1 Analysis of EDF  
The measure of default risk lies between 0 and 1, with a higher measure indicating a higher 
probability of default. Figure 1 below presents mean EDF across the years for the sample 
of 423 European firms for 2000-2019. For most of the years, the average EDF stays well 
below the 0,05 mark, indicating an average low probability of default. There are clear 
spikes in the results in the years 2002, 2011, 2015, 2018, and especially in 2008, when it 
reaches its maximum in the timeframe in question 0,167. These are expected results, as 
years of economic distress have a clear effect on the firms’ performance and ability to 
fulfill the debt obligations. 
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Figure 2 on the other hand, illustrates the distribution of the EDF for 423 firms in the 
sample during the time in question, about 8460 firm-year observations. The majority of 
firms have an average probability of default measure around zero-mark, which is in line 





Figure 2. EDF distribution across 423 firms for 2000-2019 




Analyzing the EDF results further, I have measured the average probability of default 
across a total of 23 industries presented in my data (see Figure 3 and Table 3 below). The 
top three industries with the highest average EDFs in the 2000-2019 period are 
Automobiles & Auto Parts, Retailers, and Energy – Fossil fuels. While they are at the top 
of the list, the values of EDF are considerably less than 1 – 0,0494; 0,0413 and 0,0406 
respectively. The three industries having the lowest average EDFs are Pharmaceuticals & 
Medical Research, Consumer Goods Conglomerates, and Personal & Household Products 
& Services with values being significantly below the 0,01 mark.  
 
 
















Table 3. Average EDF across industries within the sample 
 TRBC Business Sector Name N % Avg_EDF Renewable Energy 1 0 % 0,023936 Consumer Goods Conglomerates 3 1 % 0,000191 Applied Resources 6 1 % 0,009503 Personal & Household Products & Services 7 2 % 0,001451 Food & Drug Retailing 10 2 % 0,018443 Automobiles & Auto Parts 13 3 % 0,049418 Healthcare Services & Equipment 13 3 % 0,011111 Software & IT Services 13 3 % 0,011252 Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research 15 4 % 0,000125 Technology Equipment 15 4 % 0,013915 Transportation 15 4 % 0,029806 Chemicals 16 4 % 0,00309 Retailers 16 4 % 0,041287 Telecommunications Services 18 4 % 0,020342 Utilities 18 4 % 0,003768 Food & Beverages 21 5 % 0,017928 Mineral Resources 25 6 % 0,031399 Energy - Fossil Fuels 27 6 % 0,040602 Real Estate 27 6 % 0,02595 Cyclical Consumer Products 28 7 % 0,013385 Cyclical Consumer Services 28 7 % 0,023102 Industrial Goods 40 10 % 0,01781 Industrial & Commercial Services 46 11 % 0,024985 
Total/Average (std. deviation) 421 100 % 0,019 (0,014)  
However, if I exclude the economic crisis year 2008, the results are slightly different (see 
Figure 4 below). The top three industries with the highest average EDFs are Energy – 
Fossil fuels, Renewable Energy, and Retailers. The bottom three industries (however less 
prone to distress) are still Pharmaceuticals & Medical Research and Consumer Goods 
Conglomerates, but also Applied Resources. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of EDF measures across industries, excluding the crisis year 2008 
 
Further, I looked at the top three industries with the highest EDF over the period in 
dynamic. Note, in the previous graph 2008 has been removed, but the below Figure 5 
includes 2008. Energy – fossil fuels industry has a highly volatile EDF trajectory with 
spikes in 2002, 2008, 2011, 2015, and 2017.  
 
This is expected, because of the dependence on the oil prices and them being affected in 
every economic downturn. Renewable energy, on the other hand, does not seem to have 
been affected by the 2008 crisis like most other industries. The top three industries with the 
highest EDFs in 2008 were Automobiles & Auto parts, Retailers, and Real Estate (see 
Figure 6 below).  
 
Renewable energy had a slightly higher probability of default is 2002 and later only one 
more spike in the entire 20-year time span, in 2012. The rest of the time, it is an industry 
with one of the lowest EDFs. Note, as shown further in this section of my thesis, this 
industry is only represented by one firm in my sample, and therefore it is hard to generalize 












Retailers’ EDF reflects well the global economic downturns, having elevated EDF 
especially in 2008 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 5. Top three industries with the highest average EDF measures across the 2000-
2019 timeframe. 
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4.2 Analysis of ESG score and ESG Controversies  
The summary table 3 below shows the shares of the sample’s firms for each industry. Most 
of the firms in the sample are in the Industrial & Commercial Services and Industrial 
Goods, each account for 11% and 10% of the sample, respectively. Less than ten firms 
represent the following industries: Personal & Household Products & Services, Applied 
Resources, Consumer Goods Conglomerates, and Renewable Energy. Notable, the 
Renewable Energy industry is represented by only one firm in the sample. 
 
Table 4. ESG Scores and ESG Controversies scores distribution across the sample 






The overall distribution of the ESG scores across the sample for the years 2001-2019 is 




I further investigate ESG scores’ distribution across the time 2001-2019 (there were no 
registered ESG activities for the firms in the sample in 2000 reported by Refinitiv), which 
is illustrated in Figure 8 below. The number of the firms reporting the ESG data has grown 
over time, only by 2010 did all 423 firms start reporting the data needed for assigning the 
ESG score. There is an upward trend in the average ESG scores over time, also after 2010 
when all firms are included in the sample. This was expected as the sustainability trend has 
started and been developing over the last decade, more regulations have been passed over 
the years as well as the firms try to use ESG activities as a competitive advantage.  
 
ESG controversies scores’ distribution across the sample is presented in Figure 9 below. 
As can be noticed, most firms tend to have higher ESG Controversies scores, located close 
to 100-mark, which indicates the absence of the scandals in the ESG performance. This 
measure is composed based on the independent reports of the controversial activities in the 
media as opposed to the ESG score, which is based on the data reported by the firms 
Figure 7. ESG score distribution across the 423 non-financial European public firms in 2001-2019 
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Figure 9. Distribution of average ESG Controversies scores for each company in the sample. 
 
Figure 8. Average ESG score across the time span of 2001-2019 for the sample of 423 European non-financial public firms. 
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The distribution of the ESG Controversies score across time has been fluctuating between 
85 and 90 in 2001-2013 (also note the growing number of firms), which is presented in 
Figure 10 below. Since 2010, it has been mostly improving and reached its peak in 2015. 
However, after that, the average ESG Controversies scores across the sample have been 
decreasing and fell below the 85-mark in 2019, This shows how different the ESG score 
and ESG Controversy scores are. The former is based on the actual measures provided by 
the firms, while the latter is based on the controversial events happening to the firms in the 
sample.  
Figure 10. Distribution of ESG Controversies score over the time of 2001-2019 
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ESG scores and ESG Controversies scores distributions across industries are presented in 
Figure 11 below. There is no significant spread between the ESG scores among the 
industries in the sample, they are mostly between 40 and 60 on average. There is, however, 
a clear trend in the ESG controversies scores with the Retailers, Software & IT Services, 
and Real Estate being the top three industries with the highest scores. A higher score 
indicates less controversial events in the industry. However, although the top three 
industries have the highest ESG controversies scores, their ESG scores are not the highest 
in the sample (the three industries with the top ESG scores are Utilities, Renewable 
Energy, and Food & Drug Retailing). 
 
In their working paper on the sample of the U.S. and European firms between 2003 and 
2017, Bannier et al. (2019) analyze ESG data of over 10000 firm-year observations in the 
U.S. and over 11000 firm-year observations in Europe. They have included financial firms 
in the sample as well. They found that the total ESG score for the U.S. firms in their 
sample was 50,8 (standard deviation 16,76) and for the European firms slightly higher 56,7 
(standard deviation 16,26). In my sample the result is somewhat similar, the total ESG 
score is 53,28 with a standard deviation of 20,84. Below is summary table 4 with the entire 










Figure 11. Distribution of ESG Scores and ESG Controversies scores across industries in the sample 
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Table 5. Average ESG Scores and ESG Controversies scores for the sample 
Score Mean STD 
ESG Score 53,28 20,84 
ESG Controversies Score 87,03 26,25 
 
Dorfleitner et al. (2020), focusing on the ESG Controversies score and profitability of 
ESG-focused portfolios, study both European and U.S. firms between 2002-2018. Their 
sample includes approximately 900 European firms and 1000 U.S. firms (number varies 
between the years), including Financial industry firms, but excluding penny stocks. Their 
findings show a negative correlation between the ESG score, and the Controversies score 
for the entire sample – (-0,3107) explaining further that companies with higher ESG scores 
tend to have lower Controversies score, possibly because they are under a closer watch – 
“the higher you fly, the harder you fall”. In my sample, I did not find similar results, the 
correlation between the ESG scores and Controversies score in my case is positive – 
(0,4568), though they do not fully correlate. Possibly, in the European sample, the situation 
could be different, if the companies reporting their ESG scores are also trying to be careful 
with any possible negative publicity related to the ESG. As for the average Controversies 
scores for the U.S. and European firms, Dorfleitner et al. report average ESG 
Controversies scores of 46,53 (21,91) and 48,36 (21,24) respectively (standard deviation is 
stated in brackets). In my sample, the average ESG Controversies score for the European 
firms is 87,03 (26,25). 
 
4.2 Regression results  
The first panel of regression results is reported in Table 6 below. I started with OLS 
regression on EDF and ESG_score including control variables one by one. The Model 1 
regression shows the statistically significant at 5%-level negative result indicating that the 
ESG activities decrease the probability of default. With one standard deviation increase in 
the ESG score, the EDF decreases by 0,000205. It represents a 20,4% decrease compared 
to the EDF sample mean1. This result would suggest no support for my first hypothesis, 
however, with the addition of the first and the following control variables, we can notice 
 1 The economic significance is computed based on the coefficient on ESG_score (0,000205) multiplied by the standard deviation on the ESG_score variable from Table 1 (20,854), which equals 0,004275. The effect represents roughly 20,4% of the sample mean of EDF from Table 1 (0,02). 
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that the sign of the ESG_score coefficient changes to positive, indicating the positive 
relation between the ESG_score and probability of default (Model 2-7, all ESG_score 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1%-level). As mentioned in the theoretical 
overview, the causality could go in the opposite direction as well. 
 
Table 6. OLS regression of EDF and ESG_score 
 
By introducing the first control variable, the effect of the ESG_score becomes non-
negative, which means that the increase in ESG_score by one unit increases the probability 
of default by 0,000796 or an 82% increase compared to the EDF sample mean. lnEquity 
thus has taken all the negative effects on EDF (-0,002512 at the 1% significance level). 
Another control variable contributing to the decrease of the probability of default (at a 
statistically significant level of 1%) is Inverse volatility. The statistical significance 
disappears for Excess_return and ROA after the robustness check. 
 Dependant variable: EDF 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_score -0,000205** 0,000796*** 0,000766*** 0,000627*** 0,000595*** 0,000602*** 0,000605*** 
  (-2.6739) (7,2870) (6,2811) (5,5658) (5,4872) (5,5148) (5,5477) 
lnEquity   -0,002512*** -0,02476*** -0,02811*** -0,02437*** -0,02281*** -0,022648*** 
    (-10.346) (-9,4638) (-10,0705) (-9,2881) (-8,8371) (-8,8174) 
Excess_return     -0,008002 -0,007643 -0,007816 -0,007059 -0,007079 
      (-0,4461) (-0,4366) (-0,4502) (-0,4205) (-0,4210) 
lnDebt       0,004198*** 0,004079*** 0,00362*** 0,003598*** 
        (8,7153) -8,9224 (7,9890) (7,9542) 
1/σE         -0,006983*** -0,00784*** -0,007794*** 
          (-7,8485) (-10,1828) (-10,1506) 
ROA           -0,005452 -0,054444 
            (-1,8490) (-1,8401) 
Amihud             0,059252** 
              (2,7382) 
Firm Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,00114 0,07391 0,07791 0,09678 0,1121 0,1127 0,1136 
F-statistic 9 058 282,9 199,9 190,2 179,4 147,7 127,8 This table reports on the estimates of the OLS regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the 
independent variable ESG-score. Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. No fixed effects have been applied. The 
regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, 
representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for 
robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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The ESG_score coefficient slightly decreases after controlling for lnDebt in Model 4 and 
Model 5 and stays at around 0,0006 after all control variables have been added. It 
represents a 63% increase compared to the EDF sample mean. 
 
The next step of the analysis is the relation between ESG_contr (ESG Controversies) and 
EDF. I run an OLS regression in the same manner as I did with the ESG_score variable, 
adding gradually control variables. The results are presented in Table 7 below. This result 
is interesting compared to the effect we observed from the ESG_score regression, as it 
shows the opposite effect of ESG_contr on EDF. ESG_contr has a negative relation to 
EDF in all models of my OLS_regression (Model 1-7), and the coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%-level after adding already the first control variable.  
 
Table 7. OLS- regression of EDF and ESG_contr 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_contr -0,000066 -0,000429*** -0,000482*** -0,000427*** -0,000366*** -0,000362*** -0,000362*** 
  (-1,0114) (-6,5534) (-5,9332) (-5,5762) (9,8016) (-4,784) (-4,7805) 
lnEquity   -0,002205*** -0,021846*** -0,02611*** -0,022403*** -0,02076*** -0,020583*** 
    (-10.3856) (-9,7503) (-10,4332) (-9,4460) (-8,9485) (-8,9177) 
Excess_return     -0,008539 -0,00803 -0,008209 -0,00744 -0,007465 
      (-0,4706) (-0,4555) (-0,4690) (-0,4396) (-0,4402) 
lnDebt       0,004392*** 0,004288*** 0,00378*** 0,003768*** 
        (8,7858) (8,9476) (7,9825) (7,9536) 
1/σE         -0,006714*** -0,00743*** -0,007383*** 
          (-8,0360) (-9,9351) (-9,9042) 
ROA           -0,064084* -0,064102* 
            (-2,0799) (-2,0734) 
Amihud             0,056838** 
              (2,7266) 
Firm Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,000068 0,0708 0,077991 0,09638 0,1121 0,1108 0,1116 
F-statistic 1,48 270,1 199,9 189,3 179,4 144,9 125,3 This table reports on the estimates of the OLS regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the independent variable ESG_contr. Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. No fixed effects have been applied. The regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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After all control variables have been added, EDF is decreased by 0,000362 units with an 
increase in one unit of ESG_contr. This represents a 47,7% decrease compared to the EDF 
sample mean. This result supports my third hypothesis since the higher the ESG-
controversy score is the better the firm handles its ESG risks. 
 
We can see the negative effect is slightly being taken away by adding lnEquity, lnDebt, 
Inverse volatility, and ROA variables. lnEquity, Inverse volatility, and ROA have a 
negative effect on EDF as well (lnEquity and Inverse volatility at 1% significance level 
and ROA at 10% significance level). lnDebt and Amihud positively affect EDF at 1% and 
5% significance level respectively.   
 
Table 8. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_score, year- and firm-fixed 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_score -0,000077 0,000336* 0,000335* 0,000321* 0,000321* 0,000341* 0,000342* 
  (-0,5601) (2,3346) (2,3326) (2,2635) (2,2655) (2,4432) (2,4529) 
lnEquity   -0,067334*** -0,067304*** -0,067257*** -0,06645*** -0,065556*** -0,065401*** 
    (-12,9998) (-12,4411) (-12,5030) (-12,3051) (-11,9823) (-11,9478) 
Excess_return     -0,000154 -0,000145 -0,000265 -0,000117 -0,000133 
      (-0,0138) (-0,0131) (-0,0237) (-0,0108) (-0,0122) 
lnDebt       0,002025*** 0,002006*** 0,001771*** 0,001771*** 
        (4,5737) (4,5333) (3,9401) (3,9376) 
1/σE         -0,001285* -0,001106 -0,001089 
          (-2,2169) (-1,8383) (-1,8123) 
ROA           -0,046886* -0,047227 
            (-1,3708) (-1,3785) 
Amihud             0,019925 
              (1,0411) 
Firm Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,209 0,2455 0,2454 0,247 0,2473 0,2452 0,2452 
F-statistic 3,966 6,199 6,184 6,219 6,214 6,057 6,046 
This table reports on the estimates of the fixed-effect regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the independent variable ESG_score Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. Fixed effects on year and firm have been applied. The regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Further, I continue my analysis by running fixed-effect regressions. I fix for both year and 
firm first, then for a year only, and then for firm only. Tables 8-10 report results of fixed-
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effect regressions on EDF and ESG_score, Tables 11-13 report results of fixed-effect 
regressions on EDF and ESG_contr.  
 
After adding the fixed effect of the year and the firm (Table 8 above), the ESG_score’s 
coefficients are considerably smaller and only significant at 10%-level in Models 2-7. 
Similar to the linear regression results, the fixed-effect regression results show that 
ESG_score affects the default probability positively after adding control variables as well. 
The statistical significance of the ESG_score coefficients is considerably lower in the first 
fixed-effect regression when both firm and year effects have been fixed. While fixing for 
both time and firm effects, the ESG_score coefficient in the last model 7 (Table 8) is 
0,000342, though at the significance level of only 10%. It represents a 35,7% increase in 
EDF in terms of economical significance when compared to the EDF sample mean. In this 
case, when both firm and time effects are fixed, it is hard to determine what takes away the 
ESG_score effect. Therefore, I continue with the fixed-effect regressions – fixing for the 
firm and for time separately.  
 
The results of these two regressions are presented in table 9 (fixed year effect) and 10 
(fixed firm effect). We can see that the coefficient of ESG_score after all control variables 
have been introduced is smaller when the year effect has been fixed. The coefficients in 
both regressions are statistically significant at 1%-level. Both regressions however support 
my first hypothesis – ESG_score is positively related to the probability of default. When 
the year-effect is fixed, ESG_score has a positive coefficient of 0,000633 (66% increase 
compared to the EDF sample mean), and when the firm-effect is fixed, ESG_score 
coefficient is positive 0,000866 (90,3% increase compared to the EDF sample mean). 
There is also a consistent and statistically significant at 1%-level positive relation of 
lnDebt and EDF in all three fixed-effect regressions, which is expected as Debt is one of 
the main determinants of the default risk. Interestingly, in the year-fixed effect regression, 
Amihud has a significant 5%-level positive effect on EDF, showing that with every 1-unit 
increase in Amihud, EDF increases by 0,06788. No significant effect has been shown in 




Table 9. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_score with fixed year effect 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_score -0,000212* 0,000851*** 0,000847*** 0,000661*** 0,000642*** 0,000629*** 0,000633*** 
  (-2,3502) (7,0625) (6,7402) (5,6750) (5,6393) (-5,5229) (5,5569) 
lnEquity   -0,023158*** -0,023105*** -0,025822*** -0,023625*** -0,021672*** -0,021473*** 
    (-9,8368) (-9,5512) (-10,1183) (-9,6583) (-8,9580) (-8,9482) 
Excess_return     -0,001967 -0,001767 -0,002157 -0,001629 -0,001646 
      (-0,1449) (-0,1331) (-0,1613) (-0,1258) (-0,1269) 
lnDebt       0,003708*** 0,003686*** 0,003059*** 0,00303*** 
        (8,6138) (8,7812) (7,1026) (7,0741) 
1/σE         -0,004628*** -0,005214*** -0,005151*** 
          (-6,1842) (-7,3935) (-7,3666) 
ROA           -0,09002* -0,090181* 
            (-2,3881) (-2,3833) 
Amihud             0,06788** 
              (2,8697) 
Firm Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,0964 0,1541 0,1542 0,1685 0,1744 0,1739 0,1751 
F-statistic 40,65 64,34 62,33 66,07 65,88 61,78 59,83 














Table 10. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_score with firm-fixed effect 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_score -0,000125 0,000946*** 0,000911*** 0,00089*** 0,000871*** 0,000886*** 0,000886*** 
  (-1,3296) (8,017) (6,8412) (6,7211) (6,5878) (6,5022) (6,5029) 
lnEquity   -0,073553*** -0,072329*** -0,072208*** -0,068835*** -0,068505*** -0,068423*** 
    (-14,240) (-12,8911) (-12,9152) (-12,2991) (-11,6917) (-11,6583) 
Excess_return     -0,005134 -0,005079 -0,005277 -0,004945 -0,004956 
      (-0,3472) (-0,3447) (-0,3589) (-0,3495) (-0,3500) 
lnDebt       0,002317*** 0,002235*** 0,002073*** 0,002074*** 
        (4,8537) (4,7324) (4,3679) (4,3676) 
1/σE         -0,003579*** -0,003705*** -0,003698*** 
          (-5,4743) (-5,8085) (-5,7988) 
ROA           -0,004032 -0,004168 
            (-0,1069) (-0,1105) 
Amihud             0,013333 
              (0,5685) 
Firm Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,0539 0,1848 0,1864 0,1887 0,1915 0,1907 0,1906 
F-statistic 1,951 4,777 4,808 4,855 4,919 4,823 4,812 




The last part of the regression results analysis is the analysis of the fixed-effect regressions 
on EDF and ESG_contr. The results are presented in tables 11-13 below. When running a 
regression on EDF with ESG_contr and controlling for all control variables as well as 
using the year- and ticker-fixed effect, the regression does not produce significant results 
for the ESG_contr effects. Control variables lnEquity and lnDebt still have a statistically 




Table 11. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_Contr with fixing on year and firm 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_contr -0,000079 0,000009 0,00001 0,000013 0,000015 -0,000011 -0,000012 
  (-1,2056) (0,1521) (0,1527) (0,2165) (0,2330) (-0,1878) (-0,1943) 
lnEquity   -0,066746*** -0,06697*** -0,066685*** -0,065879*** -0,064852*** -0,064697*** 
    (-13,3435) (-12,5401) (-12,5994) (-12,3883) (-11,9175) (-11,8876) 
Excess_return     -0,000261 -0,000249 -0,000368 -0,000217 -0,000233 
      (-0,0233) (-0,0223) (-0,0328) (-0,0201) (-0,0215) 
lnDebt       0,002057*** 0,002038*** 0,001796*** 0,001795*** 
        (4,7094) (4,6650) (3,9784) (3,9762) 
1/σE         -0,001286* -0,001103 -0,001086 
          (-2,2645) (-1,8427) (-1,8159) 
ROA           -0,049771 -0,050113 
            (-1,4049) (-1,4124) 
Amihud             0,019466 
              (1,0012) 
Firm Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,1564 0,2448 0,2447 0,2465 0,2467 0,2445 0,2445 
F-statistic 3,97 6,18 6,166 6,203 6,197 6,039 6,027 
This table reports on the estimates of the fixed-effect regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the independent variable ESG_contr. Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. Fixed effects on both firm and year have been applied. The regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%  
When fixing for the year effect only, the ESG_contr coefficients become significant at 1%-
level (Table 12, Model 2-7). In contrast to the ESG_score, the ESG_contr has a negative 
effect on EDF – (-0,000322) in Model 7, when all control variables have been introduced. 
It also represents a 42,4% decrease in EDF in relation to its sample mean. This result 
supports my third hypothesis – ESG Controversies is negatively related to the probability 
of default. It is also a good example of how ESG Score and ESG Controversies score do 






Table 12. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_contr with fixing the year effect 
 
 
On the other hand, when fixing the firm-effect, the regression does not produce significant 









 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_contr -0,000033 -0,000419*** -0,000417*** -0,000367*** -0,000333*** -0,000323*** -0,000322*** 
  (-0,5129) (-5,6610) (-5,4275) (-5,0132) (-4,6039) (-4,4031) (-4,3909) 
lnEquity   -0,019654*** -0,01962*** -0,023711*** -0,021555*** -0,019624*** -0,019406*** 
    (-9,7148) (-9,5207) (-10,3586) (-9,7849) (-8,9777) (-8,9614) 
Excess_return     -0,002249 -0,00193 -0,00231 -0,001759 -0,001777 
      (-0,1641) (-0,1449) (-0,1719) (-0,1533) (-0,1365) 
lnDebt       0,004036*** 0,004018*** 0,003344*** 0,003318*** 
        (9,2662) (9,4278) (7,6695) (7,6384) 
1/σE         -0,004372*** -0,004793*** -0,004734*** 
          (-6,5518) (-7,2475) (-7,2079) 
ROA           -0,097813* -0,098068* 
            (-2,5505) (-2,5470) 
Amihud             0,06556** 
              (2,8052) 
Firm Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,0953 0,1496 0,1498 0,1673 0,1725 0,1721 0,1732 
F-statistic 40,18 63,12 60,25 65,51 65,03 61,02 59,06 
This table reports on the estimates of the fixed-effect regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the independent variable ESG_contr. Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. Fixed effects on year have been applied. The regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 13. Fixed-effect regression on EDF and ESG_contr with fixing the firm-effect 
 Dependent variable: EDF 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ESG_contr -0,000124 -0,000068 -0,000063 -0,000059 -0,000056 -0,000084 -0,000084 
  (-1,873) (-1,0901) (-1,0183) (-0,9557) (-0,9078) (-1,3925) (-1,3983) 
lnEquity   -0,066607*** -0,065427*** -0,065469*** -0,062037*** -0,061158*** -0,061075*** 
    (-14,5238) (-12,6994) (-12,7689) (-12,1999) (-11,9028) (-11,8731) 
Excess_return     -0,006286 -0,006198 -0,006384 -0,006041 -0,006053 
      (-0,4086) (-0,4051) (-0,4189) (-0,4117) (-0,4121) 
lnDebt       0,002527*** 0,002435*** 0,002233*** 0,002335*** 
        (5,4437) (5,2689) (4,7515) (4,7520) 
1/σE         -0,003803*** -0,003986*** -0,003979*** 
          (-6,2680) (-6,4669) (-6,4467) 
ROA           -0,023487 -0,023622 
            (-0,6111) (-0,6141) 
Amihud             0,013459 
              (0,5619) 
Firm Fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064 6929 6929 
Adjusted R2 0,0542 0,1742 0,1766 0,1793 0,1826 0,1815 0,1814 
F-statistic 1,96 4,513 4,564 4,622 4,694 4,598 4,588 
This table reports on the estimates of the fixed-effect regression with the dependant variable being the probability of default EDF and the independent variable ESG_contr. Models 1-7 differ by the inclusion of control variables. Fixed effects on the firm have been applied. The regressions are performed on an unbalanced sample, with the total number of firm-year observations varying between 6929 and 7064, representing 423 European non-financial public firms between the years 2000-2019. Standard errors have been controlled for robustness. T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%  
5. Conclusion  This research is focusing on the effect of ESG activities of non-financial European public 
firms on the probability of default. I perform the study on data associated with ESG scores 
and ESG Controversies scores of 423 firms, about 8460 fir-year observations, available in 
the Refinitiv database in the investigation period of 2000-2019. For calculating the 
probability of default measure, I use the structural form of Merton’s distance-to-default 
method, as described by Baghdadi et al. (2020).  
 
Engagement in ESG activities may create a conflict of interest between management and 
stakeholders and agency problems occur. As pointed out by Barnea and Rubin (2010), 
management may enjoy benefits from higher ESG activities, while ignoring the value-
optimization objectives. Cash outflow requirements for the ESG activities can lead to 
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opportunity costs and potentially limit the access to the cash needed for the firm’s value-
optimization. This can in turn limit the firm’s ability to pay its debt obligations and 
increase the default risk of the firm.  
 
On the other hand, the ESG Controversies scores indicate the presence or absence of 
controversial ESG events in the company’s performance. As Dorfleitner et al. (2020) 
argue, this information may improve the information efficiency of the market. They also 
point out, that noting absence of the controversial events can be beneficial for small 
companies, whose information is often overlooked and therefore incorrectly priced by the 
market. 
 
The results of my investigation show that with the increase of ESG score, the probability of 
default also increases based on the data of the sample. The result is significant at 1%-level 
in both fixed-effect regressions: 1) only year-effect is fixed, 2) only firm-effect is fixed. 
And although the correlation between the probability of default and ESG scores in my 
sample is negative (note, not statistically significant), the multiple regression results 
suggest a positive relationship between these two variables. This supports my first 
hypothesis – the ESG scores may be increasing the probability of default, which could be 
explained by the agency theory. On the other hand, ESG Controversies scores have 
negative relations with the probability of default, the result is significant at 1%-level when 
the year-effect alone is fixed. 
 The endogeneity concerns, full exploration of which lies beyond this research, have been 
partially eliminated by controlling for fixed effects and including control variables. 
Although some studies do not account for it or find no evidence for reverse causality in the 
case of sustainability and corporate financial performance, it should still be noted that 
reverse causality is possible between the probability of default and higher ESG activities, 
and research focusing on this matter is needed.  
 
5.1 Limitations and future research  Potential future research could be focused on the analysis of the relationship between 
separate ESG-pillars and default risk. The risk, on the other hand, can also be broken down 




Another limitation of my study lies within the fact that the ESG scores in the Refinitiv 
database are only “definitive” for the years prior to the past five years, which means that 
corrections can be added for the past five years’ data points in case of the company’s 
restatements or changes in the underlying data (Refinitiv, 2021). This means that in case 
someone would like to collect the same data for the same sample as mine, they will not 
necessarily match, if the five years have not yet passed.  
 
Baghdadi et al. (2020) investigate endogeneity concerns in their work, which seems 
reasonable to investigate the ESG-EDF relationship as well. It is not clear at this point 
whether the increasing ESG-activities of the firm increase the probability of default or the 
firm with an increasing probability of default is trying to perform on the ESG-activities 
because of that. 
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Appendix  Variable definitions 
Amihud Amihud measure of illiquidity. Annual average of the daily ratio of the 
absolute value of stock return divided by dollar trading volume, 
multiplied by one million as per Amihud (2002). 
Annual 
return 
The firm’s annual stock return is calculated from monthly returns over 
the previous year. 
EDF Expected default frequency, calculated as N(-DD), where DD is 
distance-to-default, which is calculated following Merton (1974) and 
Bharath and Shumway (2008), and N(.) is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution function. 
ESG_score The ESG score was obtained for each firm-year from the Refinitiv 
Database. For more details on calculating the score, refer to Refinitiv 
(2021). 
ESG_contr ESG controversy scores were obtained from the Refinitiv Database 
Refinitiv (2021). 
Equity The market value of equity in EUR is calculated as the product of a 
number of shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of the year, 
both obtained from the Refinitiv Database. 
Excess return Annual excess return is the difference between the firm’s annual stock 
return calculated from monthly returns over the previous year and return 
on the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. 
Debt Face value of Debt in EUR calculated as the sum of short-term debt and 
one-half of long-term debt, both obtained from the Refinitiv Database.  
σE Stock return volatility, i.e. annualized standard deviation of returns, 
estimated from monthly stock returns over the previous year. Returns 
obtained from the Refinitiv Database. 
ROA The ratio of net income to total assets, both obtained from the Refinitiv 
Database. 
 
